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There is a need to understand the changing provisions that governments make for public engagement 
in energy infrastructure decisions, but the existing literature is deficient in focusing mainly on single 
case studies. In response, we conduct a multi-sectoral, comparative analysis for the first time to assess 
how UK governments have engaged publics, applying a novel mapping methodology that is 
systematic, longitudinal and cross-technology. Moreover, our focus embraces mechanisms of 
consultation and support measures (e.g. community benefits) and seeks to explain patterns of change 
using a pragmatic sociology framework. Findings indicate trends towards a reduced scope for public 
engagement alongside expanded encouragement of community benefits, but also important sectoral 
differences. On-shore wind moved towards giving local decision-makers significant control over 
decisions. Gas-fired power stations experienced continuity, with central government controlling 
consents and limited interest in community benefits. Fracking facilities received intense promotion of 
community benefits, alongside incremental moves to restrict local decision-making. We argue that the 
patterns observed reflect government beliefs about the scope for depoliticisation in concrete 
situations, in which the conjunction of technologies, sites and publics affect how and whether 
arrangements for public engagement change. These results raise challenges for how researchers seek 




‘We need a system that always says ‘yes’ to the right sorts of development ... which delivers 
the infrastructure, transport and energy we need to thrive in this new century of ours ... We 
also need a system that is much more democratic’ (Pickles 2011) 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Decision making about new energy infrastructure – power stations, major grid lines, 
hydrocarbon supplies – is caught up in a series of worldwide challenges.Firstthere is the need 
tofashion systems of provision that address the so-called energy ‘trilemma’, by 
beingenvironmentally sustainable, secure and affordable. Second is the sustained call for 
greater public engagement in decision-making around energy, frequently advocated by 
researchers and civil society groups,often under-scored by international conventions. Taken 
together, these challengesraisemajor questions around whether, how far and in what forms 
public engagement is functional for the delivery of transformed energy systems (MacKerron 
2009).Such questions in turn reflect enduring tensions aroundthe roles of democracy in 
navigating society through ecological crisis (Ophuls 1973; Jacobs 1997; Stirling 2014). 
Given these challenges, governments are searching for institutional ‘fixes’ that meld public 
engagement and legitimacy with energy policy agendas informedmainly by political priorities 
and particular forms of expertise (Sovacool 2017).One effect is that decision making 
procedures for energy infrastructure in many countrieshave undergone rapid and repeated 
changes (Marshall 2012), with new arrangements for citizen participation bound up with a 
host of other measures intended to promote, inter alia, social acceptance of new 
infrastructure projects by ‘affected communities’. In the UK, diverse combinations of public 
engagement measures have emerged, includingmoves to speed up consenting decisions, 
expand the use of pre-application public consultation,,and channelling‘community benefits’ 
to places that host facilities.The ambit of public engagement is also affected by steps that 
extend or retract the authority of national political representatives.A complex picture is 
developing, exacerbated by the way that changing public engagement practices are being 
applied differently to different energy technologies, such thatonshore wind, other renewables, 
frackingand nuclear power are each subject to particular combinations ofmeasures.The 
diversity of changecreates challenges for all actors involved, and governments aredecried for 
their ‘inconsistency’ (Carrington 2014; Toynbee 2014; ENDS Report 2015). 
The concern that drives theanalysispresented here is that the ways in which states actually 
seek to orchestrate public engagement in energy infrastructure decisions has important 
implications for the relationships between energy transitions, democracy and justice but 
rarely receives adequate research attention. Infrastructure projects are constitutive of broader 
energy pathways, a source of significant environmental, social and economic impacts, and a 
tangible focal point for public concerns, yet energy infrastructure decision-making processes 
are rarely subjected to systematic appraisal. Indeed, such an exercise falls down the cracks 
between the major bodies of research. Burgeoning research on energy transitionshas a 
conceptual armoury for bridging micro- and macro- forms of change, with ‘the social’ an 
embedded part of ‘socio-technical regimes’ that characterise dominant forms of (energy) 
provision (see Verbong and Loorbach 2012). Yet, its origins mainly in studies of technology 
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and innovation means that analystsrarely foreground publics as significant actorsor engage 
with research on infrastructure siting and conflict (Cowell 2017).At the same time, mostof the 
voluminous research into infrastructure siting and public responses tends to focus on single 
cases and particular technologies and frames its goals in instrumental terms (e.g. ‘getting to 
yes’ or promoting ‘social acceptance’), rarely connecting siting decision-making with broader 
political and technological changes (Aitken et al 2008).In this, most researchers echo wider 
tendencies in public engagementresearch, where only to a limited extent have researchers 
integrated macro- and micro- perspectives, to locate the ‘diffusion of participation’ within a 
specific historical context (Moini 2011, p.156). 
This paper makes claims to empirical and conceptual innovation. Empirically, we 
systematically map for the first time changes to public engagement policiesin the UK over 
time and, importantly, across different energy infrastructures. Rarely have analyses of public 
engagement in energy infrastructure decision-making sought to encompass such breadth, and 
exploit the potential insights of cross-technology comparison (although see Owens 1985). 
Furthermore, in its approach to understanding the ways in which governments have sought to 
orchestrate ‘public engagement’, the analysisembraces modes of consultation and 
participation in consenting decisions alongside other mechanisms for securing public support 
– we call them ‘support measures’ - focusing on flows of financial benefits to 
communities.Most infrastructure siting research focuses on one set of mechanisms or the 
other, not how they have developed together. We aim to address this gap. 
Clearly, however, decidinghow to‘map’ change is not innocent of theory, and the analysis 
seeks to be innovative in the conceptual framework that it uses for interpreting change in 
public engagement practices. We have sought to move beyond the more familiar frameworks 
of political-theoretic or ethical critique (Metzger et al 2015; Moini 2011). Instead, we have 
drawn upon frameworks that seek to deal seriously with the diverse (energy infrastructure) 
objects being considered and the ‘situations’ they create, and that can understand how 
engagement practicesand other measures,infrastructural objects and publics come together to 
stabilise social institutions(or fail to do so).This concern with what happens in concrete 
situations also provides a way of interpreting how macro-level changes in public engagement 
practices evolve. Our approach maps shifts in public policy instrumentation, afterLascoumes 
and Le Galès (2007), as appropriate to our broad-scale analysis of policy change, but seeks to 
achieve some sensitivity to the diverse energy infrastructures at play by drawing on the ‘new’ 
pragmatist sociology of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006).In recognition of the delivery-
democracy dilemma that introduced the paper, our mapping gives particular attention to shifts 
towards openness or closure around energy infrastructure decisions, contributing to 
understanding of the links between project decision-making, democracy and energy 
transitions(Smith and Stirling 2007). 
The context for our analysis is the UK and England in particular, which is of heuristic value 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the UK exemplifies many of the challenges faced by states 
that have achieved significant expansion of renewable energy (supplying 25% of electricity in 
2016), yet face difficult decisions in determining how more profound decarbonisation might 
be achieved. Secondly, the UK government has subjected public engagement procedures 
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around energy infrastructure to numerous changes in the period under examination, 2008-
2017, thus providing an active sphere for analysis.Thirdly,government and industry figures 
routinely introduce any energy-related announcement with rhetoric about the massive scale of 
infrastructure investment required: for example ‘(e)nergy makes up over half the total 
infrastructure investment pipeline ... and close to double the amount for transport’1.  
In the next section of the paper, we review contending approaches for interpreting how 
governments seek to orchestrate public engagement, teasing out implications for energy 
infrastructure and transitions. Following this, we outline our mapping framework and sketch 
our methodological approach. We then proceed to set out our findings, first summarising the 
prima facie patterns in the way that public engagement and support measures have changed 
and then offering interpretations of the outcomes that we see. The paper ends with 
conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
 
 
2.0 Interpreting changes in public engagement in energy infrastructure decisions 
 
2.1 Alternative conceptual perspectives 
Analysts of energy infrastructure siting conflicts have often treated the ‘rules’ governing 
public engagement as a static backcloth to the analysis of social responses. Too rarely has 
consideration been given to the shifting ways in which governments seek to orchestrate the 
procedures and ambit of public engagement, the knowledge claims that may legitimately bear 
on decisions, and how this affects the power of different actors (Aitken et al 2008). 
Nevertheless, there are conceptual frameworks – mostly used outside the energy sphere –for 
understanding the mechanisms and directions in which institutional change unfolds. 
Researchers  seeking to understand the historical evolution of public engagement practices 
have tended to adopt one of a number of critical lenses. Some draw upon political 
economy,for exampleMoini(2011), who sees the increased deployment of participation as 
mainly about the legitimising power of economic elites under neo-liberalism. The key pattern 
is thatpublics are involved in policy-making and decisions in ways that compensate for the 
social, economic (and environmental) consequences of pro-market policies but leave the main 
dogma of competitiveness unaffected (Moini, ibid; Cooke and Kothari 2001).Scholars using 
Foucault’s work on governmentalityposition the deployment of community involvement as a 
means of social regulation although, as Marinetto (2003) argues, have tended to underplay 
the importance of central government interventions. 
Such critical perspectives have been applied to understand the evolution of land use planning 
policy, which provides a series of apertures for publics to engage with infrastructure 
decisions. In the context of infrastructure planning, Legacy (2016) reviews how narratives of 
‘urgency’ and ‘exceptional circumstances’ help legitimise changes to decision-making 
processes that ‘truncate and minimise the opportunities for disruption’ to infrastructure 
implementation (2016, 2). Such ‘foreclosure of the political’ (Legacy 2016, 2), or 
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‘depoliticisation’ (Wood and Flinders 2014), may include reducing spaces where critical 
engagement around more fundamental social and environmental concerns such as need or 
alternatives could take place, and shifting decision-making to technical arenas(see also 
Owens 2004). Privatisation in many spheres of infrastructure provision, including energy, 
have also handed spheres of decision-making to independent bodies (like regulators) and 
private companies, also reconfiguring the scope for democratic processes, public engagement 
and challenge (Cotton and Devine-Wright 2010; Groves et al 2013). 
Critical theoretical perspectives clearly offer useful insights for grasping the connections and 
disconnections between democracy and energy transitions, but a number of issues are left 
unresolved. First, analysts tend to construct theoretical arguments wholly in terms of social 
relations, without giving much importance the physical objects involved (Beauregarde 2011); 
in our case, to different energy infrastructures. Yet as researchers from a ‘techno-politics’ 
position increasingly argue,  the objects in focus can affect how and why certain things 
become political, in the sense of becoming open to contingency and debate, while others do 
not (Barry 2002; Marres and Lezaun 2011), and co-construct the publics involved (Chilvers 
and Longhurst 2016).As noted by Callon et al (2009), some projects give rise to controversies 
where arguments ‘overflow’ the parameters created by project promoters and the formalised 
channels of decision-making, and government efforts to orchestrate public engagement 
approaches fail to contain the dispute. 
Second the evaluative stance of many theorists often assumes that closure of democratic 
debate or opportunities for public participation is alwaysundesirable and problematic. 
However, analysts of sustainability transitions have recognised that steering our way towards 
a more sustainable low-carbon energy system requires that there are aspects and moments 
when the direction of travel and choice of technology must be opened up for deliberation and 
contestation of alternatives, and periodswhere there needs to be a degree of closure, to 
provide a stable institutional context for delivering change (Smith and Stirling 2007). 
These dilemmas around infrastructure delivery,  public engagement and the relationship to 
wider democratic steering point us to our final concern with many critical perspectives, which 
is that the emphasis on domination fails to deal adequately with the ‘pluralistic character of 
the modes of assessment and attachments operative in social life’ (Boltanski 2011, 47). The 
existence of plural, incommensurable principles creates ambiguities about how best to 
orchestrate public engagement practices vis-a-vis other means of legitimising decisions. 
 
2.2 Insights from pragmatist sociology 
What is required is a framework that can help us to understand how and when governments 
seek to orchestrate the relations between public engagement and infrastructure delivery, the 
fate of these efforts, and which is sensitive tothe energy infrastructure objects at stake. We 
propose the pragmatist sociology of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006; Boltanski 2011) as 
apotentially useful approach. Their centralconcern is with the making, un-making and re-
making of social integration, and concrete ‘situations’ are given prime importance. Situations 
are instances where disputes have emerged about the relationship between person-
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things-states, in turn generating societal desires to re-establish order. This focus provides an 
alternative to critical theories (after Boltanski (2009, p.20) in which situations tend to be 
neglected either in favour of ‘the dispositional properties of actors’ (p.20) or ‘structures’, 
ignoring the disputes in which actors are engaged. 
In their conceptualisation of situations, Boltanski and Thévenotadopt a post-foundational 
perspective in viewing society not as one single social order but rather ‘indeterminately 
structured by a plurality of conceptions and embodiments of common good and “worth”’ that 
coexist’ (Fuller 2012, 647).These ‘orders of worth’ are historically evolving but, at any point 
in time, represent ‘major legitimate frameworks within western society’ (Fuller 2012, 649) 
for making well-founded, legitimate arguments. Each provides a particular way of 
determining the common good (Arts et al 2017) but they are incommensurable. Table 1 
summarises the orders of worth framework, with the orders of ‘markets’ (the pursuit of 
private economic interest), ‘industrial’ (the pursuit of instrumental effectiveness), ‘civic’ 
(using transparent, public procedures’) and ‘fame’ (where public opinion is what matters) 
having particular relevance to energy infrastructure. 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
This conception of society and situationsunderpins akey feature of their approach - the 
attention given to the justifications of actors in shaping the possibility of coordination. Actors 
are not ciphers for particular interest positions but inhabit multiple worlds simultaneously, 
and are capable of responding flexibly to situations through their justifications. Their scope to 
do so is constrained, however, since effective public justification requires meeting standards 
of justifiability, which means choosing particular orders of worth to use in the defence of 
particular solutions. 
As Table 1 captures, each ‘order’ has a higher common principle, then bestows worth on 
particular persons and objects able to articulate them, but it is the ‘tests’ associated with each 
order that is especially germane to our concern with decision-making. In Boltanski and 
Thévenot’sframework,the concept of ‘tests’ refers to processes of verification by which the 
legitimacy of actions and objects are judged, to resolve disputes and re-establish agreement 
(Boltanski 2011, p.27). Testing processes can be institutionalised to varying degrees and it is 
the efficacy of testing processes in resolving situations that generates order or instability. 
Where it is accepted that the peoples and things implicated in a situation can be addressed 
within the tests located wholly within a specific order of worth (e.g. ‘the market can decide’) 
then solutions appear relatively simple, though there is still the possibility of something 
external(e.g. non-market factors) ‘contaminating’ the test, calling its legitimacy into question 
(Annisette and Richardson 2011). Sometimes however, disputes concern which mode of 
justification is relevant to the particular situation at hand. This can create a need to forge 
some kind of compromise without coming to any foundational agreement on the pre-
eminence of a particular form of worth, and these compromises may be built into some kind 
of composite arrangement. Such compromises may become durable in that they are seen as 
effective, but all compromises have the potential for fragility, because the failure to resolve 
the fundamental clash of principles leaves them vulnerable to being exposed and denounced 
as a sacrifice of one order or another. 
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History suggests that governing energy infrastructure development continually 
generatestensions between multiple orders of worth, as disputes erupt about whether social 
institutions are a sufficiently good ‘fit’ with  the situation. Consequently, the arrangements of 
decision-making – as a set of tests – are likely to face pressure in their construction and 
maintenance, as they seek to stabilise some kind of compromise between worths, objects and 
subjects from different orders.For example, giving more space to market orders (i.e. allowing 
developers flexibility to choose technologies without the need for public justification), or the 
efficient achievement of targets, technically-derived (industrial orders) diminishes the space 
for transparent tests of ‘public interest’, built on civic orders. Treating national government 
ministers as qualified persons for adjudicating consents frames the role of other, more local 
collectives. Importantly, the compromises may be more or less precarious in different 
situations, based on the person-states and things-states at play. Situations may arise that 
render previous tests unstable by calling their compromises into question e.g. pollution 
incidents, or the formation of organised pressure groups focused on issues that have been 
compromised ‘out’ of test procedures. 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework is high-level andrequires careful application to 
particular research fields, with one particular aspect warranting comment. Boltanski and 
Thévenot are silent on the scale of the polity to which they refer (Honneth 2010) but, in 
practice,seeking to re-scale public engagement or support measures - affording more 
importance to actors at local, regional or national scales -is an important means by which 
states seek compromises between the different orders of worth embodied in making 
infrastructure decisions i.e. different issues can be open for discussion in national 
arenasversus specific projects in particular locations(Owens 2004). In constructing tests for 
determining energy infrastructure projects, one should be alert to how far the state tries to 




3.1 Mapping parameters 
The approach of Boltanski and Thévenot provides a potentially useful framework for 
addressing our key questions: 
1) How have decision-making procedures and support measures for energy infrastructure in 
the UK changed in the period 2008-2017? 
2) How have the changes been justified and how have the publics to be engaged been 
represented? 
3) How has the state struck balances between openness and closure around what can be 
subject to debate, and what does this say about how publicengagement intersects with energy 
transitions? 
The research was designed to assess and compare developments in public engagementand 
support measures across an array of energy infrastructures, both novel and extant, over time, 
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facilitating interpretation of both wider, temporal changes and technology-specific patterns. 
Given our prime concern with the policy level, categories are required for basic mapping of 
changes in public engagement practices. Here we draw on the categories of public policy 
instrument from Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007), but adapt them to reflect key questions in 
the instrumentation of public engagement. Table 2 provides a summary. 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
Adopting Lascoumes and Le Galès’categories is useful, in that it alerts us to how instrument 
choice can be constitutive of policy choice and change. They also invite the expectation that 
any category of energy infrastructure will be subjected to public engagement practices that 
combine a diversity of instrument types i.e. they providecomposite tests that compromises 
across multiple orders of worth (after Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
In line with our pragmatist conceptual approach, we also examine the following in particular: 
• Justifications – arguments that are used to publicly rationalise existing or new modes 
of public engagement in energy infrastructure decisions-making, also noting those spheres in 
which justification is seen as unnecessary; 
• Openness/closure – the extent to which changes to public engagement procedures 
affect the range of issues that are legitimately open for discussion; 
• Conceptions of the public – whether represented as citizens to be engaged or as 
recipients of benefits, as individuals or as part of some collective (e.g. ‘local communities’).  
• Scale – whether changes to public engagement or support measures, and the 
justifications for them,seek to afford more importance to social collectives at local, regional 
or national scales.  
 
3.2 Parameters and data sources 
Although the research adopts a much wider, multi-sector comparative research design than 
most studies of public engagement in energy infrastructure, it is still necessary to delimit 
what is included. For ‘energy infrastructures’ we focus on those that constitute the gamut of 
energy generation investment coming forward in the UK: electricity generating stations 
powered by fossil fuels (mainly gas), nuclear and various renewable energies, and fracking 
facilities. We do not include the plethora of smaller scale infrastructure – micro-renewables, 
smart meters, energy efficiency investments etc. – directly in our analysis. (Of course, 
whether infrastructure is considered sufficiently large and impactful to require consent from 
government is itself an important boundary to the scope for public engagement – a 
compromise, in Boltanski and Thévenot’s terms (2006), between civic and other orders of 
worth.)To keep the breadth of the research manageable, we also exclude certain necessarily 
connected infrastructures, such as electricity transmission and distribution networks and 
waste management facilities, though we recognise that these have often been 
controversial.The focus is confined to changes in public engagement practices in England, 
given the diversity of practices across the devolved governments of the UK2, and 
encompasses changes since 2008, following implementation of the Planning Act 2008, 
though with an awareness of arrangements previously in place.While many policy changes 
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for energy infrastructure are entangled in wider shifts in land use planning policy (see Tait 
and Inch 2016), we focus on changes that have energy infrastructure specifically as their 
object. 
Our primary data source for identifying changes to public engagement practicesand support 
measures, and the rationales presented for them, is documentary. We use the public 
documents associated with the policy changes: speeches announcing and justifying potential 
changes and the policy statements that explain and implement the actual change. Policy 
statements and speeches areimportant sources of justifications that, as above, form part of the 
labour of achieving change and institutionalisation in potentially disputatious situations. As 
Boltanski (2011, p.2) suggests: the exercise of power is ‘subject, at least formally, to 
requirements of justification that impart a certain robustness to them’. Ministerial speeches 
from June 2010 to June 2017 were identified from the website 
‘https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements’. An initial contents analysis search was 
conducted for all speeches referencing ‘energy’ or ‘planning and building’, identifying those 
in which ‘energy’, ‘public’, ‘community’, ‘infrastructure’ or engage’ were mentioned. This 
first stage allowed us to organise the data so that a more fine-grained, thematic analysis could 
be performed (Braun and Clarke 2006). This examined the justifications employed by policy 
makers when discussing changes to decision-making procedures. Table 6 below gives the full 
set of relevant speeches.3 
 
4.0 Findings and discussion 
 
4.1 Summarising the changes 
Tables 3 and 4 capture the main changes seen in the data. 
Turning first to changes in the ways that publics are engaged as citizens, through consultation 
and participation mechanisms, a number of patterns stand out.  Firstly, there are important 
areas of continuity. Within the UK, energy infrastructure has long been treated as an 
exceptional category of built development in that consent decisions on ‘major’ projects are 
taken by central governmentrather than local councils, with local councils and the public 
being engaged as consultees. This persisted through our period of analysis, with a long-
standing aspect of this compromise being that ‘major’ for generating stations is taken to be 
over 50MW installed capacity. There is continuity too with other categories of infrastructure, 
such as electricity generation projects below 50MW (i.e. most renewable energy projects) and 
fracking facilities, in that the prime decision-making body for all applications is local 
councils and publics have opportunities for consultation at this level. Central government 
only takes a role when individual decisionsare pulled in for their own determination, either by 
calling them in or ‘recovering appeals’4, an issue discussed further below.  
Such basic continuity belies significant changes. The Planning Act 2008 included steps to 
‘speed up’ the consenting regimes for major electricity generation and grid lines, fixing in 
statute and regulation the time allowed for key stages of the process, but also requiring pre-
application consultation (Lee et al 2012; Marshall and Cowell 2016). Initial arrangements in 
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which consents were determined by an independent ‘Infrastructure Planning Commission’ 
(IPC) were revoked in 2011, to return consenting powers to central government Ministers. 
There are also specific technologies that depart from this wider pattern, notably on-shore 
wind where projects over 50MW have seen their status as ‘major’ projects (‘Nationally 
Significant Infrastructure Projects’ [NSIPs]) removed, such that all projects of whatever 
capacity are determined by local councils. 
Incentives-based instruments have seen dramatic changes, as Table 4 shows. Across an array 
of energy technologies from the 1990s onwards (Cowell et al 2008), there has been agrowth 
inad hoc, voluntary provision of various forms of benefits by infrastructure developers to 
communities; usually geographical communities deemed affected in some way by the project. 
Overlaying this, we have seen measures by government (and sometimes energy sector trade 
associations) to steer this activity through additional instruments, for example the creation of 
voluntary guidelines, embodying prospective standards for the levels and procedures for 
delivering community benefits. However, governments have not generally instituted 
legislation or regulation to mandate action. This may reflect the contested legitimacy of 
providing community benefits, with critics claiming that the issuing of payments (reflecting 
market orders of worth) risks contaminating the virtues of transparent decision-making made 
on planning criteria (rooted in civic orders of worth). A key discourse of critique here is that 
of ‘bribery’ (Cass et al 2010).  Governments have been able to be firmer in its 
instrumentation in promising to channel public funds arising from infrastructure development 
to nearby communities – notably prospective royalties from fracking, use of the seabed by 
offshore wind, or increasing local retention of business rates. 
Two further aspects of the deployment of community benefits warrant comment. Firstly, one 
can see a shift in justifications issued by government (Table 6).  From claims that delivering 
benefits to communities will foster more positive responses to development – a kind of 
market logic, inferring that payments incentivise assent (Cowell et al 2011; Conservative 
Party 2010) - there has been an increasingly developed narrative that communities should 
share the benefits of energy infrastructure development, in which conceptions of distributive 
justice are more prominent. With fracking, for example, Ministers have stated ‘local people 
should feel they are getting their fair share from the development of shale’ (Fallon 
17.07.2013) and for wind, communities should ‘see real benefits from the facilities that they 
host’ (Hendry 25.05.2012) (see Table 6). 
Secondly, government and corporate activity around community benefits has been decidedly 
uneven between types of infrastructure. Community benefits have been an ad hoc practice 
with gas-fired power stations and for renewables other than wind. Government became much 
more active in promoting community benefits with fracking and, until 2015, with on-shore 
wind, including bold provisions for community shared ownership. However, although 
successive governments accepted the advantages of community-owned energy projects, they 
have received relatively little positive treatment in the consenting process. Policy remains 
ambiguous over how far the extra social advantages of such ownership forms are legitimately 
considerable in the tests of consenting decisions (Strachan et al 2015). 
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Looking at justifications more widely, other patterns stand out. Overall, the frequency of 
ministerial speeches addressing aspects of public engagement and support mechanisms is 
highly uneven across time and infrastructure technologies, reflecting the emergence of 
initiatives and concerns with particular types of infrastructure at particular times. Moreover, 
publics, infrastructure and instrument change is justified in different ways in different 
contexts. Looking at speeches by planning ministers, the key narrative is that ‘planning 
processes should be locally controlled’ because ‘when local people have a real say over 
development they are more likely to welcome it’ – an instrumental justification for public 
engagement (Pickles 10.01.2015). Simplified guidelines, less ‘red tape’ and removal of ‘top 
down bureaucracy ‘have been presented as supporting this positive relationship. However, 
planning ministers almost never referred to energy infrastructure when talking about public 
engagement – the object concerned was ‘development’ in a broad sense and often housing in 
particular. By contrast, energy ministers tended to represent planning as a ‘burden’ on 
infrastructural development, thus justifying changes, and public engagement was not 
something that pertained to the civic tests ofinfrastructure consenting processes, but to 
community benefits5. Common to almost all references to publics, however, was the scalar 
representation of them as ‘local’ and ‘communities’ - localising and collectivising narratives 
that seek to meld engagement and delivery by presenting publics as uninterested in wider 
strategic issues. Only for fracking do we see efforts to justify community benefits as serving 
constituencies at community, local council and regional scale. In none of the speeches were 
publics represented as ‘energy citizens’ (Devine-Wright 2006) in relation to the national or 
systemic level. 
 
4.2 Openness and closure 
In their justifications for the Planning Act 2008, Ministers were keen to stress that the new 
system ‘puts the public at the centre of the process’ (Blears 2008), but the various changes to 
public engagement processes, summarised in Table 5, require careful interpretation. 
Certainly, the legislation made new, statutory provision for pre-application consultation with 
local communities, though this must be read alongside the ways in which particular issues 
have been opened or closed for discussion across the period under analysis. 
A key innovation of the 2008 Act  was the introduction of National Policy Statements, 
designed to provide clear statements on government policy and, especially, to specify the 
national ‘need’ for certain categories of project (‘Nationally Significant Infrastructure 
projects’) and thereby justify not allowing this issue to be re-opened in individual project 
consents (DECC 2011). It has long been the case that issues of need for energy infrastructure 
are not ‘normally’ legitimate objects for discussion or objection in consent decisions 
(O’Riordan et al 1988). Arguably, the NPS represent an intensification and formalisation of 
this position, creating a  ‘planning cascade’ for major infrastructure projects in which need is 
resolved before individual project consents come forward, in order to reduce consenting 
processes to seek to details of siting choice and impact (see Owens 2004).  Further scrutiny of 
the NPS shows how such justification for excising need from individual project consents 
compromises civic with market orders of worth: need cannot be challenged because it is for 
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developers to judge the kind of infrastructure that they consider viable or feasible, and not for 
government or others to question it (DECC 2011, para 3.3.6). 
However, at national level, opportunities have been created for institutions of representative 
democracy. Parliament can scrutinise and approve draft NPS, which are also available for 
public consultation. The Localism Act 2011 returned the final decision on infrastructure 
projects to government Ministers from the independent IPC, which it abolished. Ministers 
were keen to reassure developers that ‘there will be no unnecessary delay in decision-making 
as a result’ (Hendry 14.06.2011): industrial and market orders underpinning delivery would 
be pre-eminent. 
In other respects too, the issues open for discussion are contained, though the practices vary 
between technologies. For NSIPs like gas-fired power stations, the NPS rules that it is 
inadmissible for the consents process to assess the GHG implications of projects against 
national carbon reduction targets (DECC 2011, para 5.2.2). It is for developers to take a 
market-based view of the weight to attach to carbon reduction in the light of the incentive 
instruments of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). With fracking, actions have been 
taken to greatly extend developers’ rights of access to the sub-surface environment, thus 
removing underground issues from arenas of public contestation, to more firmly enforce the 
16 week performance standard for local planning authorities to make decisions, and to give 
the government specific grounds to call in local council decisions or recover appeals for its 
own determination (Stokes 2016). 
Overall one could say that UK energy infrastructure consenting has experienced various 
forms of closure of what is permitted for public discussion in conjunction with increasing 
promotion of community benefits, with justifications emphasising distributional fairness over 
procedural fairness (Cowell et al 2011; Goodkoep and Devine-Wright 2016). Onshore wind 
is the exception. Not only have all consenting decisions been passed to local arenas, but 
Government has also made it a requirement of consent that there is demonstrable local public 
support (DCLG 2016). The construction of tests in which ‘local people have the final say on 
windfarm applications’ (Conservative Manifesto 2015, 57), in which national direction has 
been treated as the contaminating element and been removed, is not applied to any other 
category of energy infrastructure. Industrial and market orders of worth are marginalised, 
even though such logics might support on-shore wind as the cheapest, most straightforwardly 
investable form of renewable energy. 
 
4.3 Interpreting the patterns 
The large number of changes captured in Tables 3, 4 and 5 constitute policy turbulence, and 
have attracted criticism for their inconsistency (Carrington 2014; Toynbee 2014; ENDS 
Report 2015). But can a cross-sector, cross-instrument, longitudinal analysis of what has been 
happening tease out plausible explanations? 
Certainly, theorists interested in how neo-liberal ideologies foster depoliticisation could find 
material to support their positions. Echoing Moini (2011), we see steps to remove key issues 
like ‘need’ from openpublic contestation while reserving significant decision-making 
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flexibility for commercial actors, with such closure serving the creation of a more certain 
investment environment (Legacy 2016; Marshall and Cowell 2016). Energy infrastructure 
decision-making seems to echo wider trends in UK land use planning, in which neo-liberal 
thinking informs the view that planning (and thereby the apertures for public engagement it 
contains)must be streamlined, contained, and de-risked (Tait and Inch 2016). As one Minister 
stated (Jones 30.06.2014), ‘(t)here is absolutely nothing more crucial to efficient 
infrastructure development ... than a benign, flexible and practically-focused planning 
system’.Viewed through the orders of worth at stake (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), such 
tests from the civic world must not unduly undermine market or industrial logics, and so must 
be compromised against. 
Analysts have also explained the growth of community benefits as arising from the same 
logic, whereby communities are paid a ‘price’ for hosting infrastructure but have less voice 
(Cowell et al 2011). Again, market orders of worth have won out over the civic. This may 
explain why (after Moini 2011), we can see justifications for instrument changes that detach 
public concerns from debates about wider development trajectories or issues of need and 
attach them to ‘local issues’, notably by constant reference to publics as ‘(local) 
communities’, implying that they should be interested only in localised siting concerns. 
However, the problem with adopting these kinds of critical perspectives is that the changes 
analysed do not amount to blanket closure of the scope for contestation or political 
intervention. While Government has often sought to contain what is discussable within 
consenting processes – a key moment when controversy could arise – the will to remove 
opportunities for representative political engagement is less evident. Ministers took back 
responsibility for major infrastructure consent decisions, and have also been active in 
intervening in local planning decisions on smaller scale energy infrastructure through 
‘recovered appeals’ and ‘call ins’. The Black Ditch wind project, proposed for a site near the 
M5 motorway in Somerset is just one of many wind energy decisions recovered for 
determination by the Minister and declined consent (Toynbee 2014). Recovered appeals have 
been an important element in granting consents for fracking facilities, overturning local 
council refusals, as at Preston New Road, Lancashire. Ministerial control has also been used 
to override project consenting procedures in the past.6 
At a broad level one can say that objects matter, and that energy infrastructure, because it is 
bound up with the potential controversies surrounding the energy trilemma, makes it difficult 
to depoliticise decision-making (Kuzemko 2014), in the sense of removing influence from 
those that can claim national electoralmandates. Given this, one might interpret the evolution 
of public engagement practices as simply a concomitant of energy policy i.e. as a reflection 
of the kind of energy infrastructure projects that central governments believes constitute an 
efficient and effective part of the UK’s future energy mix. The diverse directions of 
instrument change are simply ‘the tactical use of regulation’ (Stokes 2016, 986) in the pursuit 
of development objectives. So, nuclear power and gas are seen as integral to future electricity 
supply mixes(DECC 2011), and to this end have been subjected to new, speeded-up decision-
making regimes and, with nuclear, various provisions for community benefits. 
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The very different arc travelled by public engagement processes for onshore wind can also be 
interpreted as reflecting energy policy shifts. Prior to 2010, expanding on-shore wind was 
seen as critical to helping the UK meet renewable energy targets, and so was subject to a 
flurry of reforms to speed up decision-making, reinforce positive planning decisionsand 
foster social acceptance.Ministerial justifications supported these actions, arguingthat it 
should be: ‘socially unacceptable to be against wind turbines in your area – like not wearing 
your seatbelt or driving past a zebra crossing’” (Stratton 2009). From 2010, after a change of 
government, political consensus around renewable energy expansion and on-shore wind in 
particular began to fragment.From 2015 Ministers took the view that there was already 
sufficient on-shore wind energy investment in train to meet the short-term 2020 renewable 
energy targets set by the EU. With delivery concerns dissipating,government acted to shift 
public engagement measures towards a set of arrangements that allowed, effectively, a local 
veto over all new wind projects. Official interest in fostering greater social acceptance or 
public engagement faded; ministers ceased making speeches justifying their actions, and 
specific policy initiatives on shared ownership (see Table 4) have been all but ignored. When 
added to the curtailment of market support for on-shore wind, large numbers wind energy 
projects in the development pipeline failed to proceed.Undifferentiated economistic accounts, 
seeing shifting decision-making as driven by government desires to foster jobs and growth, 
have difficulty accounting for the diverse experiences of these different technologies. 
 
4.4 Responding to situations 
The explanations above recognise the ways in which states exercise ‘strategic selectivity’ in 
how they govern, but still reduce the shifting patterns of public engagement to a linear 
product of energy policy, realised in some ‘higher’ analytical realm, then translated into 
institutional change. It ignores the various ways in which the situations created around energy 
infrastructures – or fears about potential situations - have generated questions about the 
appropriateness of prevailing public engagement arrangements. Looking at the changing 
instruments, and at the justifications, we can see governments working to maintain stability 
around facets of energy policy, but also struggles to engineer compromises between goal 
delivery, public engagement and legitimacy. A number of examples stand out. 
Nuclear power is a pre-eminent example of how a history of controversy across a number of 
arenas has driven changes to public engagement procedures. The creation of the fast track 
NSIPs process under the Planning Act 2008 and reduced ambit of public examinations can be 
seen as designed precisely to avoid the protracted inquiry that affected the UK’s last new 
nuclear power station, Sizewell B,which sat for 340 days between 1982 and 1985(DTI 2007; 
Hatchwell 2015). For on-shore wind, the intense policy innovation around community 
benefits makes sense in relation to governments responding to mounting controversy arising 
from wind farm projects. In 2015, political party control of government shifted to the 
Conservatives, more sensitive to the increasing electoral salience of rurally-based public 
opposition, with concerns growing about the costs of market support to renewables (Geels et 
al 2016). The resulting new orchestration of public engagement procedures ceased upholding 
tests in which compromises favoured market and industrial orders of worth over local public 
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engagement, in favour of arrangements that emphasisedrestrictive, locally administered civic 
tests.  
Concerns to resolve situations with legitimacy can also restrict government in the kinds of 
compromises it strikes.The Government clearlywishes to promote fracking, seeing it as an 
‘urgent national priority’ (House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee 2014, para 258), and 
has extolled its benefits to justify adjustments to the regulatory regime (Stokes 2016). Equally 
evident, however, is the clamour of opposition from a large number of protest groups in 
prospective fracking locations, national environmental NGOs and sections of political parties 
– arguably more broadly based than opposition to onshore wind. The potentially volatile 
situations around fracking projects in Sussex and Lancashire may explain why government 
moves to adjust the instrumentation of public engagement in project consenting have been 
relatively modest to date (see Tables 3-5). The unexpected event of earth tremors from a 
fracking operation at the Preese Hall 1 site, Lancashire, also created a situation in which 
safety needed to be seen to receive careful attention. At the same time, the Government has 
given significant attention to community benefits, reflecting a belief, perhaps, that a positive 
public view needs to be created, by acting on the incentives affecting publics at multiple 
scales: householders, local communities, local planning authorities and regional elites. 
However, the more major step of removing decision-making entirely from local councils is 
evidently not a step that has been taken (yet) for fracking, as it has for other energy 
infrastructure and a growing array of other development types (Tait and Inch 2016).7 
As noted above, Governments have used the mechanism for recovering appeals to implement 
policy, often overriding local decisions. Appeals might be seen as arestricted form of 
compromise within Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework: ostensibly responding to the 
exceptional nature of the situation (the site and/or project) but without violating the integrity 
of ‘normal’ tests or explicitly changing policy. Like all compromises, such actions are open 
to being denounced because of the inappropriate treatment of orders of worth, and so it has 
proved. In the case of on-shore wind, Minister’s pulling in applications for their own 
determination mainly to refuse them was widely decried as playing politics by seeking 
electoral advantage i.e.  the ‘fame’ order of worth was undermining a test that ought to 
respect civic orders of worth (Merrill 2014; Toynbee 2014). With fracking, and the Preston 
New Road example, the intervention of central government has been decried for undermining 
the principle of ‘localism’ (Vaughan 2016). 
Comparative research highlights not only that energy infrastructure technologies can vary in 
their propensity to create controversy, but that other cross-cutting, geographical factors are  
important in shaping ‘situations’that might pressurise decision-making arrangements – sites 
and places. Such geographical factors have been little examined by the pragmatic 
sociological perspective, though can be considered elements of the person-states and thing-
states around which disputes can emerge. Our comparative analysis showed how the nature of 
social responses to energy infrastructures reflects the interactions between the technologies 
themselves (any ‘inherent’ properties or risks) and the sites or places they might occupy 
(Devine-Wright, 2009), and that it is technologies with the potential to disrupt attachments to 
landscape generally, and rural landscapes in particular, that have the highest potential for 
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creating controversial situations. Moreover, it is in such situations that governments have 
struggled to construct or maintain compromises within the tests of consentingdecisions that 
seek to reinforce project delivery and markets; especially so where the competing political 
tests of elections have salience. This is evident from the experience of on-shore wind, field-
scale solar, and fracking. With solar power, Government action to greatly restrict the 
development of large field-scale projects on greenfield sites in favour of brownfield and 
building-mounted projects was justified as an effort to reduce the number of disputatious 
situations that might trigger more existential opposition to the expansion of the technology 
(see Table 6; DECC 2014). 
The salience of place in shaping situations, and affecting the maintenance of social order, is 
reinforced by counterfactual examples. Moves to accelerate consenting processes for nuclear 
power have ‘worked’ in part because of the scope to exploit sites that are ‘nuclear oases’, 
with significant local economic and social ties to the industry (Blowers and Leroy 1995). 
Whatever the economic and engineering fallibilities of nuclear energy, or the particular 
public perceptions of risk that the technology engenders, the development consent for 
Hinkley C was attained within the statutory schedule (Marshall and Cowell 2016) and 
conflicting perspectives on ‘need’ have struggled to gain political traction. The same can be 
said for gas-fired power stations, for which 34,000MW had been installed between 1988 and 
2014, vastly exceeding any other technology. Here Government has scarcely changed the 
instrumentation of public engagement in any significant way to foster social acceptance, and 
engaged in little public justification. In practice, a very high proportion of projects have re-
used old power station or industrial sites, leading to few conflictual situations in which the 
rule of the ‘tests’ for consents came under fundamental challenge(Cowell 2017). 
This conceptual frameworksuggests ways of interpreting why patterns of institutional change 
may differ in other contexts. In contrast with England, in Scotland and Wales the devolved 
governments have persisted in promoting on-shore wind and have also persisted with suites 
of public engagement and support measures that reinforce project delivery, contain the scope 
for challenge within consenting processes whilecontinuing to develop programmes of 
community benefit and ownership (Cowell et al 2017). On-shore wind has been vehemently 
resisted in both countries, but opposition to projects has failed to achieve the kind of ‘rise to 
generality’ (Boltanski2011, 34) that would challenge the positioning of wind as integral to the 
general Scottish and Welsh national interest. By interpreting ‘situations’ through the lens of 
place (Cresswell, 2004), it can be suggested that in England in particular, there is an enduring 
concernfor conservation of ‘the countryside’, founded in constructions of national identities 
(Short, 2002; Batel and Devine-Wright, 2015), which has consistently been able to express 
itself in ways that are able to pressurise decision-making processes. These dynamics have 
underpinned continuity in public engagement instruments for energy infrastructures sited in 
pre-existing, ‘industrial’ locations (i.e. nuclear, gas) and continual innovation in 
instrumentation for controversialinfrastructure proposals to be sitedin locations, typically 




This discussion of critique points to some limitations with the analysis presented here. We 
recognise that in focusing on the justifications of government, the analysis has not had scope 
to include the justifications of other actors that may support, resist or challenge the 
instrument changes we have observed, or justifications promoted in the media. There is 
certainly scope for further research that embraces this. However, the shadow of critique is 
very much present in what we observed. Justifications are generally provided where disputes 
are emerging, and thus in fields where there is a need to ‘endlessly reconfirm ... a certain state 
of reality’ (Boltanski 2009, p.99). Ministerial speeches support this, both in their repetition of 
the scale of energy infrastructure development that the UK ‘needs’, and in the ebb and flow 
of justificatory actions and instrument changes as particular technologies encounter 
challenges to delivery. Instrument change is also a reflection of successful critique, and the 
delegitimising of previous justifications (Arts et al 2017), reflected in changing tests. 
Applying Boltanski (2011, p.35) would suggest that, with wind energy especially, efforts to 
expedite the consenting process and furnish host communities with additional benefits often 
failed to be seen as just. Moreover, critics of on-shore wind (e.g. NOW, Country Guardians – 
see Hickman, 2012) proved effective opponents because their concerns were able to ‘rise to 
generality’ commensurate with the principles they sought to critique (Boltanski 2011, 134), 
by connecting their protests to collectives capable of corroborating them and offering them 




This paper aimed to achieve two things rarely attempted in research into decision-making for 
energy infrastructure. First,it maps changes in public engagement policy across time, 
spanning mechanisms for consultation/participation and engagement through benefit 
provision, and across a wide suite ofenergy technologies. Adopting this approach has been 
highly revealing. Overall, it shows energy infrastructure policy in the UK – for all the broad 
rhetoric of the necessity of delivery – to be subject to amêlée of changes, with different 
technologies subjected to different forms and combinations of interventions in decision-
making arrangements, and varying intensities of change. Although there is a broad tendency 
towards closure in what is open for discussion in decision-making processes, and a wider 
tendency to frame publics as ‘local communities’ and recipients of benefits rather than active 
citizens, there are marked differences to be observed. 
The second novel feature of the paper is the application ofBoltanski and Thévenot’s 
conceptual framework to give explanatory power to the concrete situations that infrastructure 
projects create, the ramifications for stability and change in public engagement policy, and 
the directions change might take. Using this framework shows the changes observed to be not 
simply a reflection of the shifting technological preferences of national energy policy, or the 
structural force of neo-liberalism, but also the combinations of person-states and thing-states 
that infrastructure projects embody, the latter embracing technologies and places. These 
affect the potential for some infrastructures to become politicised, and the scope for 
constructing durable compromises between delivery and engagement. The framework of 
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Boltanski and Thévenot has helped to interpret outcomes that could simply have been badged 
as ‘government inconsistencies’, by bringing the ‘things themselves’ – the disputes that can 
erupt around energy infrastructure – into the equation. This explains why we see much more 
experimentation and change with some technologies than in others.It is not simply that 
government is enacting a desire to depoliticise decisions; actions are also a reflection of the 
uneven extent to which practices that affect the engagement of publicsare believed to work or 
to be legitimate or desirable, and there are limits to this in the energy field, sometimes 
requiring new apertures for local participation or national political representatives.The 
conceptions of social order used by Boltanski and Thévenot, and the evident need to keep 
repairingand salvaging situations, offers an alternative light on the apparent obduracy and 
vulnerabilities of ‘socio-technical regimes’ within transition theory. Equally, within the 
orders of worth framework  itself, there is a need to further theorise the apparent voluntarism 
in the justifications actors choose, in relation to factors shaping the acceptable ‘normative 
grammar’ for effective arguments (Honneth 2010). 
Although this analysis focused on the UK, future research caninvestigate how these insights 
might apply in other settings. For example, in European wind energy ‘leaders’ like Germany 
and Denmark, any problems with infrastructure delivery is not located in infrastructure 
consenting procedures themselves being a ‘barrier’ to development, as the objects being 
governed enjoyed more positive support inter alia because of high levels of public economic 
engagement (e.g. as shareholders or farmers) (Szarka 2007). Indeed, the increasing size of 
projects and growing commercial involvement in wind in these countries has created 
situations that contribute to declining rates of social acceptance (Sovacool 2017).  
In making this analysis, our account highlights problems for a number of prospective 
solutions to the democratisation of energy system change.  
• Firstly, researchers need to be more careful in extrapolating general theories about the 
relationship between public engagement, social acceptance and the delivery of energy 
infrastructure. While there is significant research showing how efforts by government or 
developers to ‘short circuit’ public engagement on energy projects risks exacerbating dissent 
that threatens delivery (Huber et al 2012), much of this draws on particular national 
experiences around on-shore wind. Our research has shown how objects matter, in that 
different conjunctions of energy technologies, publics and sites can greatly affect whether or 
not particular arrangements for public engagement – be they relatively closed, centralised and 
hierarchic or relatively open to diverse publics – persist and facilitate delivery, or become 
subject to destabilising critique. 
• Second, and following from this, we endorse Chilvers and Longhurst’sbelief (2016) 
that scope for reflexivity and public engagement in governance of energy choices should be 
pursued in diverse extant collectives of participation, not through creation of new but 
detached arenas. Indeed, there is a growing view that the disruptive conflicts that 
infrastructure projects can create ought to be seen (after Marres 2007) as ‘occasions of 
democracy’, with efforts made to embrace un-organised and emergent patterns of 
engagement (Metzger et al 2015, p.21; Crompton 2015), and the focus of new claims about the 
fair distribution of benefits. However, our cross-technology comparison also shows the 
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uneven consequences of such recommendations, in that some infrastructures in certain types 
of places are much more prone to create situations in which important questions are brought 
into dispute, than others. Fracking may generate many more such ‘occasions’ than battery-
based energy storage for example. 
• Third, the complex assemblage of public engagement approaches that has been 
revealed by our cross-sectoral analysis creates problems for those who argue that the 
challenges of transition mean that we need to promote engagement in ‘whole energy system 
transition’ (Parkhill et al 2013). As our research shows, the idea that there is ‘a system’ – in 
the sense of coherent and hermetic entity that can be steered - is an aspirational and 
(sometimes) policy-based construct, not an established fact in governance terms. Part of the 
issue is that government orchestration infrastructure decision-making has tended to work to 
delimit public scrutiny, especially for any issue that is ‘systemic’ or non-local. More 
fundamentally, energy ‘systems’, like other aspects of social order, can usefully be conceived 
as built from compromises between multiple, incommensurable orders of worth. 
 
To conclude, we are not endorsing the approach to decision-making of the UK government. 
A more fundamental point that the analysis makes is to show how steering towards any 
particular energy pathway, and navigating the shifting infrastructure requirements it creates, 
is likely to entail steps that structure and manage the scope for public engagement, requiring 
decisions about which issues are open for contestation at which stage in the policy and 
decision-making process. This may require balances to be struck between different 
dimensions of justice, in the light of the situations that certain energy infrastructures create. 
There are no easy solutions, but there is an evident need to be able to chart the balances that 
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Table 1: Orders of worth and some energy dimensions 

































































































Table 2: Instruments and public engagement (after Lascoumes P and Le Galès 2007) 
 
CaC Explanation Example 
Legislative and 
Regulatory 
Category concerns actions that the 
state has mandated. 
Pre-application consultation for 
major infrastructure under 
Planning Act 2008. 
Incentive-based Instruments that affect the flow of 
monetary costs and benefits to 
publics, coming directly via the 
public purse or developers 
Proposed £100,000 for each 






Instruments that affect information 
available to communities potentially 
affected by developments 
Register of community benefits 
paid by wind farm developers to 
communities viewable on-line 
De facto and de 
jure standards 
Includes management standards that 
developers are encouraged to attain, 
some that lead to certification and 
some not. 







Table 3: Changes to arrangements for consultation and participation 
 Before 2008 2008-2016 
Onshore wind Post-application consultation; consents 
determined locally (<50MW), or by 
central government (>50MW) 
2008-2015, for >50MW, pre- and post-application consultation; statements of community 
consultation for pre-application consultation, requiring approval; time constraints; all 
consents determined by central government (by Infrastructure Planning Commission, 2008-
2012; by Ministers from 2012) 
Post 2015, pre- and post-application consultation, with all consents determined locally and 
applications needing to be within a site identified in the neighbourhood or local plan, and to 
show community backing. 
Offshore wind Post-application consultation; all 
consents determined by central 
government 
Pre- and post-application consultation; statements of community consultation for pre-
application consultation, requiring approval; time constraints; all consents determined by 
central government (Infrastructure Planning Commission, 2008-2012; Ministers from 2012; 
Marine Management Organisation (1MW to 100MW)) 
Solar PV Post-application consultation; consents 
determined locally (<50MW), or by 
central government (>50MW) 
For >50MW, pre- and post-application consultation; statements statements of community 
consultation for pre-application consultation, requiring approval; time constraints; all 
consents determined by central government (Infrastructure Planning Commission, 2008-
2012; Ministers from 2012); new scope to modify consents; 
For <50MW, post-application consultation and consents determined locally 
For both, trade association voluntary good practice guidance 
Gas (and other 
fossil thermal) 
Post-application consultation; consents 
determined locally (<50MW), by 
central government (>50MW) 
For >50MW, pre- and post-application consultation; statements of community consultation 
for pre-application consultation, requiring approval; time constraints; all consents 
determined by central government (Infrastructure Planning Commission, 2008-2012; 
Ministers from 2012); new scope to modify consents; <50MW, post-application 
consultation and consents determined locally. 
Nuclear Post-application consultation; all 
consents determined by central 
government 
Pre- and post-application consultation; statements of community consultation for pre-
application consultation, requiring approval;  time constraints; all consents determined by 
central government (Infrastructure Planning Commission, 2008-2012; Ministers from 2012) 
Fracking NA Post-application consultation; voluntary industry charter promoting wider consultation; all 





Table 4: Changes to arrangements for community benefits 
 Before 2008 2008-2016 
Onshore wind Ad hoc company practice; voluntary 
sector-led protocols 
Ad hoc company practice; voluntary sector-led protocols and good practice guidelines; 
community benefits online register; Government endorsement of sector protocols (£5000 
MW); greater local retention of business rates; policy on mandatory community share 
ownership for renewables instituted in Infrastructure Act 2015, but not implemented by 
2017.  
Offshore wind Ad hoc company practice Ad hoc company practice; Coastal Communities Funds giving % of state royalties to 
adjacent coastal areas 
 
Solar PV Ad hoc company practice Ad hoc company practice; trade association voluntary good practice guidance; policy on 
community share ownership for renewables instituted in Infrastructure Act 2015, but not 
implemented by 2017. 
Gas (and other 
fossil thermal) 
Ad hoc company practice Ad hoc company practice 
Nuclear Ad hoc company practice Ad hoc practice; Government endorsement of company practice; Government policy to 
allow local government retention of business rates, and centrally fund community benefits  
 
Fracking NA Voluntary, sector-led protocols for community benefits for each well site (£100,000) and 
1% of ensuing revenues; government policy to increase local government retention of 






Table 5: Towards openness or closure? 
 Before 2008 2008-2016 
Onshore wind Supportive guidance, with ‘presumption 
in favour of development’ 
 
By 2016, local preferences and environmental conditions paramount in 
determining consents, with applications needing to be in sites designated in a 
local or neighbourhood plan, and show that impacts fully addressed and 
communities give their backing. 
 
Offshore wind Need conventionally ultra vires. 
 
National Policy Statements makes need ultra vires for consenting; guidance 
supportive of development 
 
Solar PV NA (no object-specific instruments) 
 
From 2014-2015, ministers seek to discourage solar development outwith 
brownfield sites or roofs; granting permitted development rights (i.e. no need for 
planning consent) to schemes up to 1MW on commercial buildings. 
 
Gas (and other 
fossil thermal) 
For >50MW, need conventionally ultra 
vires. 
 
For >50MW, National Policy Statements makes need and greenhouse gas 
emissions ultra vires for consenting; guidance supportive of development; from 
2012, steps taken to make it easier to modify existing consents and streamline 
pre-application consultation. 
 
Nuclear Need conventionally ultra vires. 
 
National Policy Statements makes need ultra vires for consenting; guidance 
supportive of need for development and specific sites. 
 
Fracking NA (no object-specific instruments) 
 
Regulatory changes give rights of access to underground environment below 
300m; extension of rights to drill/frack under land without landowner’s consent, 
subject to constraints in protected areas; enforcement of 16 week time standard 
for local authorities to make consent decisions; new information/notification 




Table 6: Justifications 
Infrastructure 
Technology 
 Exemplars of justification 
(Source by document or ministerial speech) 
Other speeches making this justification 
Onshore wind ‘people must be confident that they have a full say in the way their 
communities are developed and that they see real benefits from the facilities 
they host’ (Hendry 23.05.2012) 
Huhne 24.03.2011; Huhne 22.03.2011; Hendry 23.05.2012; Davey 
14.06.2012; Davey 05.11.2013; Rudd 24.06.2015 (NB most speeches 
about wind energy embraced both on- and off-shore) 
Offshore wind ‘the public, and particularly host communities, must see the benefits of the 
moral and financial support they are providing the industry’ (Rudd 
24.06.2015) 
Solar PV A keenness that ‘inappropriate solar farms do not ruin it for the rest of the 
sector’ (Barker 12.12.2013) 
‘I want to sweep aside unnecessary regulatory barriers to the on-site 
generation of solar’ (Barker 12.12.2013) 
Barker 25.04.2013; 08.10.2013; Barker 12.12.2013; Barker 01.07.2014; 
Rudd 14.10.2014 
Gas (and other 
fossil thermal) 
‘the Government believes that there is more that can be achieved to improve 
the balance between consultation, scrutiny and delivery timescales’ (DECC 
2012, para 3.48) 
Davey 18.10.2012 
Nuclear ‘we should recognise the contribution of these communities to our long-term 
energy security’ which ‘should be able to benefit accordingly’ (Hayes 
19.03.2013) 
The NPS will ‘help ensure that the UK is a truly attractive market for investors 
by ensuring that we have a planning system that is rapid, predictable and 
accountable’ (Hendry 22.02.2012) 
Hendry 16.06.2010; Huhne 02.11.2010; Hendry 08.12.2010; Hendry 
14.06.2011;  Davey 07.02.2013; Hayes 19.03.2013; Fallon 12.09.2013; 
Fallon 05.12.2013; Verma 27.01.2014; Neville-Rolfe 01.11.2016  
Fracking ‘Local people should have greater control and say in decisions that affect 
them’ (HM Treasury 2016, 3) 
‘ensure that the benefits of shale developments are shared by communities and 
regions in which the resource is developed’ (op cit.) 
‘a community payment in return for access’ to terrain below 300m (Hancock 
07.11.2014) 
‘we need to tackle the issue of extensive planning delays head on if we are to 
reap the benefits which shale gas offers’ (Leadsom 25.05.2016) 
Davey 08.10.2012; Davey 11.03.2013; Fallon 08.05.2013; Cameron 
06.07.2013; Fallon 17.07.2013; Davey 05.09.2013; Fallon 22.11.2013; 
Fallon 24.06.2014; Hancock 07.11.2014; Hancock 13.11.2014; Leadsom 
25.05.2016 
 Other speeches included in the analysis but not referencing specific technologies are: 
- Hendry 21.10.2010; Pickles 21.03.2011; Huhne 13.10.2011; Huhne 26.10.2011; Hendry 15.11.2011; Hendry 22.02.2012; Clegg 06.08.2012; Davey 
06.08.2012; Davey 11.10.2012; Jones 30.06.2014 (speeches focusing on speeding up decisions) 
- Huhne 01.07.2010; Barker 23.10.2010; Davey 27.06.2011; Davey 04.09.2014 (focusing on community ownership of energy) 
- Barker 20.06.2011; Barker 27.02.2014; Barker 12.06.2014; Davey 12.12.2014 (miscellaneous)  










1 Fallon, speech 18.09.2013 
2 Though the fragmented nature of devolution in the energy sphere means that many such 
changes also apply directly to Wales (Cowell et al 2015). 
3 Speeches are referenced in this paper by giving the surname of the minister and the date. 
The full text of each speech can be obtained from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements, by searching within the site for ‘energy’ or 
‘planning and buildings’, whereupon speeches are listed by date of delivery. 
4 Most decisions that are subject to appeals are normally determined by inspectors (independent, public 
officials), but when appeals are ‘recovered’ inspectors take the role of issuing recommendations to central 
government Ministers, who ultimately decide. 
5 Although there are differences in the political party of Ministers issuing these speeches and 
documents, because the 2010-2015 coalition government saw energy policy controlled by a 
combination of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, there is little sign that the justifications 
used varied markedly along party political lines, except for on-shore wind. 
6 Concerns about the ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s, including the effects on coal privatisation, 
led to periods of moratoria and tighter conditionality on the consenting of gas-fired power 
stations (Marshall and Cowell 2016). 
7With fracking the Conservative Party’s 2017 general election manifesto did propose bringing 
fracking within the centralised, fast-track NSIPs regime, but this foundered in the wake of the 
Conservative’s failure to secure an outright majority, in a political context in which most 
other parties are critics of fracking. 
                                                             
